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自“阿拉伯之春”以来，俄罗斯与土耳其相继介入叙利亚危机，并围绕巴沙尔政权存续、叙利亚库尔德问题以及叙危机冲突管理进行了复杂的竞争、合作与博弈，这构成2024年底巴沙尔政权倒台的重要原因之一。在巴沙尔政权存续的问题上，俄土两国分属不同阵营，土始终谋求颠覆巴沙尔政权，俄则从坚定支持巴沙尔政权转向无奈接受其倒台；在叙利亚库尔德问题上，俄土双方立场迥异，土通过军事行动严厉打击库尔德力量，俄虽支持和利用库尔德人，但又无力阻止土耳其打击库尔德人的军事行动；在叙危机冲突管理的问题上，俄土双方曾通过阿斯塔纳机制促成停火，但最终因双方的根本分歧导致合作破裂。未来，俄土在叙利亚的竞合关系仍将深刻影响叙利亚局势发展。
Abstract：(1)刘中民：《叙利亚变天，中东大棋盘将迎来怎样的地缘政治冲击？》，澎湃新闻，https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_29613949；王晋：《叙利亚重建面临多重挑战》，中国军网-解放军报，http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16364084.html；杨玉龙：《2025年叙利亚国家重建面临的多重挑战及前景》，凤凰网，https://news.ifeng.com/c/8gIIZSxW465.(2025-02-16)
(2)余国庆：《叙利亚变局如何撬动中东地区格局》，《世界知识》2025年第1期；刘中民：《中东：战火中的变局与希望》，《光明日报》2024年12月28日。
(1)Albert Aji and Bassem Mrour,“A confident Assad vows to‘liberate’every inch of Syria”, June 08, 2016, https://apnews.com/general-news-20c5e004302547329fce544d5b8d6bfc.(2025-02-16)
(2)“Before ouster, Syria’s Assad told Iran Turkey was aiding HTS rebels”, December 14, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/before-ouster-syria-s-assad-told-iran-turkey-was-aiding-hts-rebels/7901509.html.(2025-02-14)
(3)Galip Dalay,“Turkey has emerged as a winner in Syria but must now use its influence to help build peace”, December 13,2024, https://www. chathamhouse. org/2024/12/turkey-has-emerged-winner-syria-must-now-use-its-influence-help-build-peace.(2025-02-11)
(4)“Experts react:Rebels have toppled the Assad regime. What’s next for Syria, the Middle East, and the world?”, December08, 2024, https://www. atlanticcouncil. org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-rebels-have-toppled-the-assad-regimewhats-next-for-syria-the-middle-east-and-the-world/.（2025-02-16）
(5)“Turkey and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall”, December 20, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/russia-turkey-putin-erdogan-syria-assad-afbfc5a271438c0c61142f8cb9fcb6f4.(2025-01-03)
(6)Ruslan Suleymanov,“Rebel Gains in Syria Put Russia on the Back Foot”, December 06, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/12/russia-syria-uprising-problems?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia.(2025-01-03)
(7)Galip Dalay,“Russia Just Lost Its Great-Power Status”, December 20, 2024, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/assad-fall-syria-shattered-russia-great-power-status-by-galip-dalay-2024-12.(2025-01-03)
(1)杜东辉：《叙利亚危机背景下俄罗斯、土耳其和伊朗“议题联盟”探析》，《世界经济与政治论坛》2022年第5期。
(2)Jülide Karakoç,“The Failure of Indirect Orientalism:Islamic State”, Critique:Journal of Socialist Theory, Vol.42, No.4,2014, p.598.
(3)Cemil Doğaçİpek and MehmetÇağatay Güler,“Turkey and Russia in Syrian War:Hostile Friendship”, Security and Defence Quarterly, Vol.35, No.3, 2021, p.83.
(4)张建：《大国博弈背景下的俄罗斯中东政策》，《和平与发展》2020年3期。
(5)毕洪业：《中东战略的支点：俄罗斯地缘外交中的叙利亚》，《俄罗斯东欧中亚研究》2016年第2期。
(6)“Damascus, Moscow in Reconciliation Talks with Syrian Opposition”, November 22, 2015, https://sputnikglobe. com/20151122/damascus-moscow-reconciliation-talks-syrian-opposition-1030542069.html.(2025-01-05)
(7)《叙利亚冲突：土耳其第二次召见俄国大使》，BBC NEWS中文网，https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world/2015/10/151005_syria_conflict_turkey_russia.(2025-01-05)
(8)韩克敌：《叙利亚危机：俄罗斯的目标、策略和结果》，《战略决策研究》2016年第6期。
(9)“NATO Strongly Protests Russian Violations of Turkey’s Airspace”, October 06, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nato-strongly-protests-russian-violations-of-turkeys-airspace.(2025-01-03)
(10)“Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session”, October 08, 2015, https://www. nato. int/cps/da/natohq/opinions_123522. htm? selectedLocale=en.(2025-01-03)
(11)“Russian Jet Shot Down by Turkey-As It Happened November 24”, November 24, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/12013212/Turkey-shoots-down-Russian-military-plane-on-Syria-border-live. html?.(2025-01-06)
(12)“Putin Calls Jet’s Downing‘Stab in the Back’; Turkey Says Warning Ignored”, November 24, 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/24/middleeast/warplane-crashes-near-syria-turkey-border/index.html.(2025-01-06)
(1)“Putin Calls Jet’s Downing‘Stab in the Back’; Turkey Says Warning Ignored,”November 24, 2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/24/middleeast/warplane-crashes-near-syria-turkey-border/index.html.(2025-01-06)
(2)Seçkin Köstem,“Russian-Turkish Cooperation in Syria:Geopolitical Alignment with Limits”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.34, No.6, 2021, p.5.
(3)Ömer Taspinar,“Syria, the Kurds and the End of the Turkish-American Alliance”, in Bayram Balci and Nicolas Monceau,eds., Turkey, Russia and Iran in the Middle East:Establishing a New Regional Order, Cham:Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, p.228.
(4)Mehmet Bardakçı,“Is a Strategic Partnership between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, Vol.69, No.4, 2021, p.547.
(5)王猛：《叙利亚危机的新发展与美俄的战略博弈》，载刘中民、朱威烈主编：《中东地区发展报告：转型与动荡的二元变奏（2013年卷）》，时事出版社2014年版，第272-273页。
(6)U.S. Department of State,“Remarks With Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Syrian Opposition Coalition President Moaz al-Khatib”, April 21, 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207811.htm.(2025-02-24)
(7)Muhittin Ataman and Çağatay Özdemir,“Turkey’s Syria Policy:Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities”, Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.5, No.2, 2018, p.16.
(8)İnan Rüma and Mitat Çelikpala,“Russian and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism in the Syrian Theater”, Uluslararasi Iliskiler, Vol.16, No.62, 2019, p.71.
(9)Andrej Krickovic and Yuval Weber,“Commitment Issues:The Syrian and Ukraine Crises as Bargaining Failures of the Post-cold War International Order”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.65, No.6, 2018, pp.373-384.
(10)Cenk Özatıcıand PolatÜründül,“Relations Between Russia and Türkiye in The Context of The Syrian Conflict:From Edge of the War to Strategic Cooperation”, The Rest:Journal of Politics and Development, Vol.14, No.2, 2024, p.241.
(1)董漫远：《叙利亚乱局：博弈新态势与前景》，《国际问题研究》2018年第5期。
(2)Özden Zeynep Oktav,“The Syrian Uprising and the Iran-Turkey-Syria Quasi Alliance:A View from Turkey”, in Raymond Hinnebusch andÖzlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations:Between Enmity and Amity, London and New York:Routledge, 2016, p.201.
(3)“FMÇavuşoğlu:Turkey, US can once again become allies motivated by common vision with Trump Administration”, December 05, 2016, http://www. dailysabah. com/diplomacy/2016/12/05/fm-cavusoglu-turkey-us-can-once-again-become-allies-motivated-by-common-vision-with-trumpadministration.(2025-01-27)
(4)“‘Moscow Declaration’lays out vision for Syrian peace deal, with US on sidelines”, December 21, 2016, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/2016/1221/Moscow-Declaration-lays-out-vision-for-Syrian-peace-deal-with-US-on-sidelines.(2025-01-14)
(5)Christopher Phillips,“Eyes Bigger than Stomachs:Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria”, Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No.1, 2017, p.45.
(6)杨玉龙：《从“零问题”到安全化：21世纪以来土耳其对叙利亚外交政策》，《阿拉伯世界研究》2023年第5期。
(7)李小鹿：《国际社会打击“伊斯兰国”组织的态势评估》，《阿拉伯世界研究》2016年第3期。
(1)“Russia Urges for Including Kurds in Syria Talks”, January 26, 2016, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/russiaurges-for-including-kurds-in-syria-talks/.（2025-01-06）
(2)“Kurdish PYD Opens Office in Moscow”, February 11, 2016, https://www.asbarez.com/kurdish-pyd-opens-office-in-moscow/.（2025-01-06）
(3)李亚男：《中东2017：破而难立》，《和平与发展》2018年第1期。
(4)Hasan Kösebalaban,“Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy toward Syria:The Return of Securitization”, Middle East Critique, Vol.29, No.3, 2020, p.338.
(5)Murat Yetkin,“Turkey Changes Syria Policy with Al-Assad Move”, August 21, 2016, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/murat-yetkin/turkey-changes-syria-policy-with-al-assad-move-103087.(2025-01-14)
(6)MitatÇelikpala, Viewing Present as History:The State and Future of Turkey-Russia Relations, Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 2019, p.20．
(7)Alperen Kürşad Zengin,“The Turkish-Russian‘Coalition of Interests’, in Syria:An Analysis in the Framework of Neo-Realist Theory,”inİlyas Topsakal and Ali Askerov, eds., Contemporary Turkish-Russian Relations from Past to Future, Istanbul:Istanbul University Press, p.128．
(8)董漫远：《库尔德问题与中东局势》，《国际问题研究》2017年第4期。
(9)李亚男：《中东2017：破而难立》，《和平与发展》2018年第1期。
(10)Seçkin Köstem,“Russian-Turkish Cooperation in Syria:Geopolitical Alignment with Limits”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.34, No.6, 2021, p.8.
(1)王晋：《盟友还是对手?俄罗斯与伊朗、土耳其在叙利亚问题上的关切与挑战》，《俄罗斯研究》2020年第1期。
(2)该地带是计划中由土耳其控制的塔尔艾比亚德（Tal Abyad）和拉斯艾因（Ras al-Ain）镇之间的“安全区”，不过这一区域比土耳其在行动前希望的要小；土耳其所希望的“安全区”是整个叙利亚和土耳其边境的地区，包括土耳其通过之前的跨境军事行动控制的叙利亚西北部领土。参见Umut Uras,“Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in northern Syria:One month on”,November 8, 2019, https://www. aljazeera. com/news/2019/11/8/turkeys-operation-peace-spring-in-northern-syria-one-month-on.(2025-01-15)
(3)Seçkin Köstem,“Russian-Turkish Cooperation in Syria:Geopolitical Alignment with Limits”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.34, No.6, 2021, p.8.
(4)李光、李绍先：《叙利亚局势新发展及各方博弈》，《现代国际关系》2019年第11期。
(5)“Turkey Will Launch Syria Ground Operation after Strikes-Erdogan”, November 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-63727665.(2025-01-23)
(6)文少彪、刘中民：《双向博弈：美国与叙利亚库尔德武装力量的委托—代理关系（2014~2020年）》，《西亚非洲》2022年第4期。
(7)李光、李绍先：《叙利亚局势新发展及各方博弈》，《现代国际关系》2019年第11期。
(8)Ian Lesser and Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, et al., Repercussions from Turkey’s Intervention in Northeastern Syria, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, p.1.
(1)“Turkey will launch Syria ground operation after strikes-Erdogan,”November 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-63727665.(2025-01-23)
(2)SalimÇevik, Turkey’s Military Operations in Syria and Iraq, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, 2022, p.2.
(3)Branislav Stanicek, Turkey’s Military Operation in Syria and Its Impact on Relations with the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019, p.1.
(4)2019年10月19日，特朗普总统正式宣布，美国将从叙利亚全面撤军。而在10月16日的声明中，他明确表态，土耳其与库尔德人之间的战斗“与我们无关”。这说明美国对叙库尔德武装的立场发生了重大转变。参阅Miriam Berger,“Factchecking Trump on the Kurds:Yes, they are more unsafe now. No, they aren’t more threatening than ISIS”, October 19, 2019,https://www. washingtonpost. com/world/2019/10/19/fact-checking-trump-kurds-yes-they-are-more-unsafe-now-no-they-arentmore-threatening-than-isis/.（2025-02-27）
(5)Branislav Stanicek, Turkey’s Military Operation in Syria and Its Impact on Relations with the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019, p.2.
(6)Anna Borshchevskaya,“Russia and the Kurds:A Soft-Power Tool for the Kremlin?”, Middle East Policy, Vol.30, No.2,2023, p.34.
(7)Meghan Bodette,“In Northeast Syria, Solve The Whole Problem”, December 11, 2024, https://www.kurdishpeace.org/research/conflict-resolution-and-peacebuilding/in-northeast-syria-solve-the-whole-problem/.（2025-02-27）
(1)Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye,“Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey on agreed steps to revitalize the political process to end the Syrian conflict”, December 20, 2016, https://www. mfa. gov. tr/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran_-therussian-federation-and-the-republic-of-turkey-on-agreed-steps-to-revitalize-the-political-process-to-end-the-syrian-conflict_-20-december-2016_-moscow.en.mfa.(2025-01-17)
(2)“Syria:the Astana peace process”, September 5, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180905-syria-astana-peace-process.(2025-01-27)
(3)Faysal Abbas Mohamad,“The Astana Process Six Years On:Peace or Deadlock in Syria?”, August 1, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/08/the-astana-process-six-years-on-peace-or-deadlock-in-syria?lang=en.(2025-02-27)
(4)“Syria:the Astana peace process”, September 5, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180905-syria-astana-peace-process.(2025-02-27)
(5)“Astana Process talks remain key to eventual diplomatic solution in Syria”, May 16, 2018, https://astanatimes.com/2018/05/astana-process-talks-remain-key-to-eventual-diplomatic-solution-in-syria.(2025-01-27)
(1)董漫远：《土耳其进取性地缘政治外交析论》，《西亚非洲》2022年第2期。
(2)“Turkey and Russia to Create Buffer Zone in Rebel-held Syrian Province”, September 18, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/09/17/middleeast/turkey-russia-syria-buffer-zone-idlib/index.html.(2025-01-20)
(3)Suleiman Al-Khalidi,“Turkey sends weapons to Syrian rebels facing Russian-backed assault-Syrian sources”, May 26,2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-idlib/turkey-sends-weapons-to-syrian-rebels-facing-russian-backed-assaultsyrian-sources-idUSKCN1SV0FA/.（2025-01-19）
(4)“Syria war:Alarm after 33 Turkish Soldiers killed in Attack in Idlib”, February 28, 2020, https://www. bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-51667717.(2025-01-19)
(5)“Operation Spring Shield leaves mark on Syria in 2020”, December 30, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/operation-spring-shield-leaves-mark-on-syria-in-2020/2093154.(2025-01-19)
(6)“Syria war:Russia and Turkey agree Idlib ceasefire”, March 6, 2020, https://www. bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-51747592.(2025-01-19)
(7)“Turkey-Russia agreed ceasefire in Syria’s Idlib comes into force”, Mar 6, 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/globaleurope/news/turkey-russia-agreed-ceasefire-in-syrias-idlib-comes-into-force.(2025-01-31)
(8)“Syria war:Russia and Turkey agree Idlib ceasefire”, March 06, 2020, https://www. bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-51747592.(2025-01-19)
(9)唐志超：《外溢与突围：乌克兰危机升级对中东的影响》，《俄罗斯东欧中亚研究》2022年第5期。
(1)李勇慧：《俄罗斯驻叙利亚军事基地命运未卜》，《世界知识》2025第2期。
(2)“Rebels launch large-scale attack on Assad’s forces in northwestern Syria”, November 28, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/rebels-launch-large-scale-attack-on-assads-forces-in-northwestern-syria/.（2025-01-19）
(3)Faysal Abbas Mohamad,“The Astana Process Six Years On:Peace or Deadlock in Syria?”, August 01, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/08/the-astana-process-six-years-on-peace-or-deadlock-in-syria?lang=en.(2025-01-26)
(4)李海鹏：《从“群雄逐鹿”到“三足鼎立”：叙利亚反对派的复杂演进》，《世界知识》2025年第1期。
(5)“‘Targeting Life in Idlib’:Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure”, October 15, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/10/15/targeting-life-idlib/syrian-and-russian-strikes-civilian-infrastructure.(2025-03-01)
(6)激进派批评“沙姆解放组织”与“基地”组织断绝关系，并拒绝与土耳其合作。温和派由朱拉尼(Abu Muhammed al-Jolani)领导，愿意在反对巴沙尔政权的基础上与土耳其合作。参见Engin Yüksel, Strategies of Turkish proxy warfare in northern Syria, Clingendael Institute, 2019, pp.13-14.
(7)“Dışişleri BakanıMevlütÇavuşoğlu:Brunson’un durumunda bir değişiklik yok”, August 14, 2018, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/disisleri-bakani-mevlut-cavusoglu-brunsonun-durumunda-bir-degisiklik-yok-380106.html.(2025-03-01)
(8)Francesco Siccard,“How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy”, September 14, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/09/how-syria-changed-turkeys-foreign-policy?lang=en¢er=europe.(2025-01-24)
(1)Faysal Abbas Mohamad,“The Astana Process Six Years On:Peace or Deadlock in Syria?”, August 1, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2023/08/the-astana-process-six-years-on-peace-or-deadlock-in-syria?lang=en.(2025-01-26)
(2)曾蕊蕊：《从阿斯塔纳和谈看各方在叙利亚问题上的新一轮争夺较量》，《当代世界》2017年第10期。
(3)“The Ceasefire in Idlib:Turkey’s Tactical Successes alongside Political Weakness”, March 15, 2020, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/turkey-and-the-ceasefire-in-idlib.(2025-02-07)
(4)Alice Fordham,“Russia And Turkey Agree To Syria Cease-Fire, But Idlib’s Agony Is Far From Over”, March 5, 2020,https://www.npr.org/2020/03/05/812195778/russia-and-turkey-agree-to-syria-ceasefire-but-idlibs-agony-is-likely-to-continu.(2025-02-08)
(5)Alice Fordham,“Russia And Turkey Agree To Syria Cease-Fire, But Idlib’s Agony Is Far From Over”, March 5, 2020,https://www.npr.org/2020/03/05/812195778/russia-and-turkey-agree-to-syria-ceasefire-but-idlibs-agony-is-likely-to-continu.(2025-01-31)
(6)杨玉龙：《从“零问题”到安全化：21世纪以来土耳其对叙利亚外交政策》，《阿拉伯世界研究》2023年第5期。
(7)李亚男：《土耳其在叙利亚的“鲜花与荆棘之路”》，《世界知识》2025年第2期。
(8)“Kazakhstan Ends Astana Process After 20th Round”, June 23, 2023, https://astanatimes.com/2023/06/kazakhstan-ends-astana-process-after-20th-round/;《第22轮叙利亚问题阿斯塔纳和平进程国际会议顺利举行》，哈萨克国际通讯社, https://cn.inform.kz/news/di22wenhejinguohuixing-69fe83/.（2025-02-28）
基本信息:
DOI：10.13231/j.cnki.jnip.2025.06.013
中图分类号:D851.2;D815.4;D837.4
引用信息:
[1]庄安林,刘中民.俄罗斯—土耳其关系中的叙利亚危机[J].思想理论战线,2025,4(06):119-131.DOI:10.13231/j.cnki.jnip.2025.06.013.
基金信息:
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“百年变局下国际体系与中东地区互动关系研究”（22JJD810023）; 上海外国语大学校级重大科研项目“当代中东国家对外关系史研究”（2023114005）
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